0.04/0.13 % Problem : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0. 0.13/0.17 % Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.zILBH4BUvu true 0.17/0.38 % Computer : n023.cluster.edu 0.17/0.38 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 0.17/0.38 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz 0.17/0.38 % Memory : 8042.1875MB 0.17/0.38 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 0.17/0.38 % CPULimit : 1440 0.17/0.38 % WCLimit : 180 0.17/0.38 % DateTime : Mon Jul 3 05:28:36 EDT 2023 0.17/0.38 % CPUTime : 0.17/0.38 % Running portfolio for 1440 s 0.17/0.38 % File : /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 0.17/0.38 % Number of cores: 8 0.17/0.39 % Python version: Python 3.6.8 0.17/0.39 % Running in HO mode 0.58/0.68 % Total configuration time : 828 0.58/0.68 % Estimated wc time : 1656 0.58/0.68 % Estimated cpu time (8 cpus) : 207.0 0.59/0.77 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_c.s.sh running for 80s 0.59/0.77 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif4.sh running for 80s 0.59/0.77 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_c_ic.sh running for 80s 0.59/0.79 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/15_e_short1.sh running for 30s 0.59/0.79 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_b.comb.sh running for 70s 0.59/0.79 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/40_noforms.sh running for 90s 0.59/0.79 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/20_acsne_simpl.sh running for 40s 0.59/0.80 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/30_sp5.sh running for 60s 0.61/0.83 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/30_b.l.sh running for 90s 0.61/0.88 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif.sh running for 56s 114.95/15.12 % Solved by lams/30_b.l.sh. 114.95/15.12 % done 823 iterations in 14.242s 114.95/15.12 % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p' 114.95/15.12 % SZS output start Refutation 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_specID_type, type, secrecy_specID: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_Expression_type, type, secrecy_Expression: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_Keys_type, type, secrecy_Keys: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_KS_type, type, secrecy_KS: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(set_Secrecy_KS_type, type, set_Secrecy_KS: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(set_Secrecy_specID_type, type, set_Secrecy_specID: $tType). 114.95/15.12 thf(localSecrets_type, type, localSecrets: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_KS). 114.95/15.12 thf(q_type, type, q: secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(member_Secrecy_KS_type, type, member_Secrecy_KS: secrecy_KS > 114.95/15.12 set_Secrecy_KS > $o). 114.95/15.12 thf(p_type, type, p: secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(knowle945212990e_know_type, type, knowle945212990e_know: secrecy_specID > 114.95/15.12 secrecy_KS > $o). 114.95/15.12 thf(key_type, type, key: secrecy_Keys). 114.95/15.12 thf(pq_type, type, pq: secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_kE_type, type, secrecy_kE: secrecy_Keys > secrecy_Expression). 114.95/15.12 thf(insert1671894227specID_type, type, insert1671894227specID: secrecy_specID > 114.95/15.12 set_Secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(subcomponents_type, type, subcomponents: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(ine_type, type, ine: secrecy_specID > secrecy_Expression > $o). 114.95/15.12 thf(correctCompositionIn_type, type, correctCompositionIn: secrecy_specID > $o). 114.95/15.12 thf(sup_su1712599557specID_type, type, sup_su1712599557specID: set_Secrecy_specID > 114.95/15.12 set_Secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(secrecy_kKS_type, type, secrecy_kKS: secrecy_Keys > secrecy_KS). 114.95/15.12 thf(bot_bo1785112429specID_type, type, bot_bo1785112429specID: set_Secrecy_specID). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_0_assms_I4_J, axiom, (correctCompositionIn @ pq)). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl32, plain, ( (correctCompositionIn @ pq)), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_0_assms_I4_J])). 114.95/15.12 thf(conj_0, conjecture, (~( ine @ pq @ ( secrecy_kE @ key ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zf_stmt_0, negated_conjecture, (ine @ pq @ ( secrecy_kE @ key )), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf.neg', [status(esa)], [conj_0])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl287, plain, ( (ine @ pq @ (secrecy_kE @ key))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [zf_stmt_0])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_2_assms_I1_J, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (~( knowle945212990e_know @ p @ ( secrecy_kKS @ key ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl34, plain, 114.95/15.12 (~ (knowle945212990e_know @ p @ (secrecy_kKS @ key))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_2_assms_I1_J])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_6_know_Osimps_I1_J, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (![A:secrecy_specID,M:secrecy_Keys]: 114.95/15.12 ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ A @ ( secrecy_kKS @ M ) ) <=> 114.95/15.12 ( ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_kKS @ M ) @ ( localSecrets @ A ) ) | 114.95/15.12 ( ine @ A @ ( secrecy_kE @ M ) ) ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl237, plain, 114.95/15.12 ( (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : secrecy_Keys]: 114.95/15.12 (((knowle945212990e_know @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 (secrecy_kKS @ Y1)) <=> 114.95/15.12 (((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_kKS @ Y1) @ 114.95/15.12 (localSecrets @ Y0)) | (ine @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 (secrecy_kE @ Y1))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_6_know_Osimps_I1_J])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl674, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_Keys]: 114.95/15.12 (((knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ (secrecy_kKS @ Y0)) <=> 114.95/15.12 (((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_kKS @ Y0) @ 114.95/15.12 (localSecrets @ X2)) | (ine @ X2 @ (secrecy_kE @ Y0)))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl237])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl675, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Keys]: 114.95/15.12 (((knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ (secrecy_kKS @ X4)) <=> 114.95/15.12 (((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_kKS @ X4) @ (localSecrets @ X2)) | 114.95/15.12 (ine @ X2 @ (secrecy_kE @ X4))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl674])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl676, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Keys]: 114.95/15.12 ((knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ (secrecy_kKS @ X4)) 114.95/15.12 = (((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_kKS @ X4) @ (localSecrets @ X2)) | 114.95/15.12 (ine @ X2 @ (secrecy_kE @ X4)))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('simplify nested equalities', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl675])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_1_assms_I2_J, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (~( knowle945212990e_know @ q @ ( secrecy_kKS @ key ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl216, plain, 114.95/15.12 (~ (knowle945212990e_know @ q @ (secrecy_kKS @ key))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_1_assms_I2_J])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_303_sup__bot_Oleft__neutral, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (![A2:set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ( ( sup_su1712599557specID @ bot_bo1785112429specID @ A2 ) = ( A2 ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl63, plain, 114.95/15.12 ( (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ bot_bo1785112429specID @ Y0) = 114.95/15.12 (Y0))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_303_sup__bot_Oleft__neutral])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl334, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ bot_bo1785112429specID @ X2) = (X2)))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl63])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl335, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ((sup_su1712599557specID @ bot_bo1785112429specID @ X2) = (X2))), 114.95/15.12 inference('simplify nested equalities', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl334])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_3_assms_I3_J, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (( subcomponents @ pq ) = 114.95/15.12 ( insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 p @ ( insert1671894227specID @ q @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl139, plain, 114.95/15.12 (((subcomponents @ pq) 114.95/15.12 = (insert1671894227specID @ p @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ q @ bot_bo1785112429specID)))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_3_assms_I3_J])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_253_Un__empty__right, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (![A:set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ( ( sup_su1712599557specID @ A @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) = ( A ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl19, plain, 114.95/15.12 ( (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ Y0 @ bot_bo1785112429specID) = 114.95/15.12 (Y0))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_253_Un__empty__right])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl319, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ bot_bo1785112429specID) = (X2)))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl19])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl320, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ bot_bo1785112429specID) = (X2))), 114.95/15.12 inference('simplify nested equalities', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl319])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_246_Un__insert__right, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (![A:set_Secrecy_specID,A2:secrecy_specID,B:set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ( ( sup_su1712599557specID @ A @ ( insert1671894227specID @ A2 @ B ) ) = 114.95/15.12 ( insert1671894227specID @ A2 @ ( sup_su1712599557specID @ A @ B ) ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl173, plain, 114.95/15.12 ( (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y1 @ Y2)) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y1 @ 114.95/15.12 (sup_su1712599557specID @ Y0 @ Y2)))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_246_Un__insert__right])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl683, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ Y1)) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 (sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ Y1))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl173])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl684, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ Y0)) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ 114.95/15.12 (sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ Y0)))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl683])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl685, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_specID, X6 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ X6)) = (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 X4 @ (sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ X6))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl684])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl686, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : set_Secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_specID, X6 : set_Secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ((sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ (insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ X6)) 114.95/15.12 = (insert1671894227specID @ X4 @ (sup_su1712599557specID @ X2 @ X6)))), 114.95/15.12 inference('simplify nested equalities', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl685])). 114.95/15.12 thf(fact_35_TBtheorem1a, axiom, 114.95/15.12 (![PQ:secrecy_specID,E:secrecy_Expression,P:secrecy_specID,Q:secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ( ( ine @ PQ @ E ) => 114.95/15.12 ( ( ( subcomponents @ PQ ) = 114.95/15.12 ( insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 P @ ( insert1671894227specID @ Q @ bot_bo1785112429specID ) ) ) => 114.95/15.12 ( ( correctCompositionIn @ PQ ) => 114.95/15.12 ( ( ine @ Q @ E ) | ( ine @ P @ E ) ) ) ) ))). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl256, plain, 114.95/15.12 ( (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : secrecy_Expression]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y2 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y3 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ Y0 @ Y1) => 114.95/15.12 (((((subcomponents @ 114.95/15.12 Y0) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 Y2 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 Y3 @ 114.95/15.12 bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ 114.95/15.12 Y0) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ Y3 @ 114.95/15.12 Y1) | (ine @ 114.95/15.12 Y2 @ Y1)))))))))))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [fact_35_TBtheorem1a])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1157, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_Expression]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y2 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X2 @ Y0) => 114.95/15.12 (((((subcomponents @ X2) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 Y1 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 Y2 @ 114.95/15.12 bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ 114.95/15.12 X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ Y2 @ Y0) | (ine @ 114.95/15.12 Y1 @ Y0))))))))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl256])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1158, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y1 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X2 @ X4) => 114.95/15.12 (((((subcomponents @ X2) = 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y1 @ 114.95/15.12 bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ Y1 @ X4) | (ine @ Y0 @ X4)))))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1157])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1159, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((!!) @ (^[Y0 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X2 @ X4) => 114.95/15.12 (((((subcomponents @ X2) = (insert1671894227specID @ 114.95/15.12 X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ Y0 @ 114.95/15.12 bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ Y0 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4))))))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1158])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1160, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X2 @ X4) => 114.95/15.12 (((((subcomponents @ X2) = (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X8 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4)))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_forall', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1159])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1161, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (~ (ine @ X2 @ X4) 114.95/15.12 | (((((subcomponents @ X2) = (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID)))) => 114.95/15.12 (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X8 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4))))))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_imply', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1160])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1162, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (~ (((subcomponents @ X2) = (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID)))) 114.95/15.12 | (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X8 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4))))) 114.95/15.12 | ~ (ine @ X2 @ X4))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_imply', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1161])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1163, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (((subcomponents @ X2) 114.95/15.12 != (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID))) 114.95/15.12 | (((correctCompositionIn @ X2) => 114.95/15.12 (((ine @ X8 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4))))) 114.95/15.12 | ~ (ine @ X2 @ X4))), 114.95/15.12 inference('simplify nested equalities', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl1162])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1164, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 (~ (correctCompositionIn @ X2) 114.95/15.12 | (((ine @ X8 @ X4) | (ine @ X6 @ X4))) 114.95/15.12 | ~ (ine @ X2 @ X4) 114.95/15.12 | ((subcomponents @ X2) 114.95/15.12 != (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID))))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_imply', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1163])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl1165, plain, 114.95/15.12 (![X2 : secrecy_specID, X4 : secrecy_Expression, X6 : secrecy_specID, 114.95/15.12 X8 : secrecy_specID]: 114.95/15.12 ( (ine @ X8 @ X4) 114.95/15.12 | (ine @ X6 @ X4) 114.95/15.12 | ((subcomponents @ X2) 114.95/15.12 != (insert1671894227specID @ X6 @ 114.95/15.12 (insert1671894227specID @ X8 @ bot_bo1785112429specID))) 114.95/15.12 | ~ (ine @ X2 @ X4) 114.95/15.12 | ~ (correctCompositionIn @ X2))), 114.95/15.12 inference('lazy_cnf_or', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1164])). 114.95/15.12 thf(zip_derived_cl18555, plain, ($false), 114.95/15.12 inference('eprover', [status(thm)], 114.95/15.12 [zip_derived_cl32, zip_derived_cl287, zip_derived_cl34, 114.95/15.12 zip_derived_cl676, zip_derived_cl216, zip_derived_cl335, 114.95/15.12 zip_derived_cl139, zip_derived_cl320, zip_derived_cl686, 114.95/15.12 zip_derived_cl1165])). 114.95/15.12 114.95/15.12 % SZS output end Refutation 114.95/15.12 114.95/15.12 114.95/15.12 % Terminating... 115.35/15.22 % Runner terminated. 115.35/15.23 % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting 115.35/15.25 EOF